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The Latest in Philosophy Since 2001

Boghossian to Speak on Religion as a Delusion
by paulp@philosophynews.com
26 Jan 2012 at 4:29pm

Dr. Peter Boghossian of Portland State University will be giving a speech at Portland State titled, ?Jesus, the Easter Bunny and Other Delusions: Just Say No!? The talk is being sponsored by the Freethinkers of Portland State University. Dr. Boghossian has been stirring up some controversy with his thesis that the cognitive processes that are used to form religious beliefs are unreliable and draw people away rather than towards the truth.

Philosophy News interviewed professor Boghossian recently about his ideas and Peter has appeared on the Lars Larson show and has been the subject of newspaper articles and blog posts. Philosophy News will be attending the event on Friday and will be tweetcasting live. Follow the tweetcast at #philosophynws.

Listening to the Universe
by paulp@philosophynews.com
23 Jan 2012 at 8:29am

As a philosopher, I’ve spent a good deal of my adult life trying to master the intricacies of logic and apply what I’ve learned to life. While logic has and continues to serve my life in positive ways that I could not have imagined when I began studying it, I’ve had to undergo some correction in the extent to which I’ve attempted to apply logic and reason to “being in the world.” When we encounter something positive and powerful, I think we have a tendency to want to maximize its effectiveness. When the cook in your home finds a dish everyone likes, that dish appears so often everyone begins to hate it. I grew up in the age when hacky sack was popular. Many hacky sacks were filled with little plastic beads and new buyers were instructed that boiling the new hacky sack for 3 minutes would loosen up the bag "priming" it for use. A friend of mine though that if 3 minutes were good, 6 would be better. He melted the beads so that they formed a large solid ball ruining the footbag.

If a little is good, a lot must be better.

That axiom is easy to apply to logic. Logic is so powerful and so effective that it’s tempting to want to filter everything through a logical framework. But as most learn by experience, the world doesn’t always cooperate. It’s not that logic doesn’t represent the way the world works—I think it does. The problem is with us. In a great many situations, we aren’t able to see all the variables and conditions that affect the outcomes of the situations we’re in. We’re also limited in what we can bring about many times. While logic may demand a certain course of action we are, more often than not, hampered by factors out of our control—other people (with wills of their own), unseen variables, powerful laws of nature, uncooperative weather, the needs of the kids, morally ambiguous situations—all these and many other make the “logical course of action” difficult if not impossible at times.

This is an obvious truth you say. And it is. But succumbing to this truth and finding a way to live with it—particularly if you’ve spent your life training your mind to be more logical—can be difficult along an order of magnitude that would make Sisyphus tear up with joy. But life, if it is anything, is multi-faceted requiring a conversation rather than a lecture. Many times, hopefully more often than not, we do the talking. But a great many other times, we have to listen and go along for the ride. Ignoring what the we’re being told can drive one mad.

In fact G.K. Chesterton, one of the more diverse (and frankly enjoyable) English writers of the last centuries saw the problem with his typical acuteness. In one of his more famous works, Orthodoxy (a fine book worth reading even if you don’t agree with his apologetic goals), Chesterton contrasts the healthy man with the insane one. He writes,

“The last thing that can be said of a lunatic is that his actions are causeless. If any human acts may loosely be called causeless, they are the minor acts of a healthy man; whistling as he walks; slashing the grass with a stick; kicking his heels or rubbing his hands. It is the happy man who does the useless things; the sick man is not strong enough to be idle. It is exactly such careless and causeless actions that the madman could never understand; for the madman (like the determinist) generally sees too much cause in everything. The madman would read a conspiratorial significance into those empty activities. He would think that the lopping of the grass was an attack on private property. He would think that the kicking of the heels was a signal to an accomplice. If the madman could for an instant become careless, he would become sane. Every one who has had the misfortune to talk with people in the heart or on the edge of mental disorder, knows that their most sinister quality is a horrible clarity of detail; a connecting of one thing with another in a map more elaborate than a maze. If you argue with a madman, it is extremely probable that you will get the worst of it; for in many ways his mind moves all the quicker for not being delayed by the things that go with good judgment. He is not hampered by a sense of humour or by charity, or by the dumb certainties of experience. He is the more logical for losing certain sane affections. Indeed, the common phrase for insanity is in this respect a misleading one.”

He closes the passage with an aphorism I’ve quoted often on this blog because of its poignancy:

“The madman is not the man who has lost his reason. The madman is the man who has lost everything except his reason.”

The brilliance of the observation is that the world demands a conversation. Enjoying life, even (maybe particularly) as a philosopher, requires give and take, a yielding of some control, an ability to let go and follow instead of lead. This has been and is a hard lesson for me and one I have yet to fully understand. Thankfully, my wife and two friends have helped me find some balance. One friend introduced me to existentialism. While I have to reject a lot of how existentialist thought is applied, there are significant truths in the philosophy, if it could be called that, which provide a balance to hard-core rationalist thought. Existentialism breaks down at significant points and when it falls over it falls hard. But I’ve found it’s a mistake to reject everything simply because it can’t be applied to everything.

Another friend, extremely talented photographer Pete Harris who has taken photos for this website has been teaching me a lot about listening. Pete also is a musician and so is much more artistically minded than I am. This is not to say Pete is not logical or does not live an ordered life. In many ways, he’s more focused than I am about a great many things. But he also has come to understand the points I made above—that there is much to be heard when you listen to what’s going on around you. “Listen to the universe.” he’s fond of saying.

I’ll close with two anecdotes that I think make the points I want to make. Pete and I went down to Las Vegas for a few days recently to unwind and attend a trade show. I had never been to Vegas before and Pete wanted my first experience to be a good one. As I typically do, I wanted to know the agenda; what we were doing each day, when we were doing it, how much it was going to cost, and the like. I was quite unnerved when I found out Pete had only planned a few activities through the second night. “What about the rest of the week?” I asked, “We’re going to let Vegas speak to us.” He said with a wry smile. I actually became physically ill from the thought. But I finally was able to let go and “wandered” with Pete around Vegas. We bounced from place to place building the narrative of our holiday moment by moment. And Vegas did speak to us and I had one of the most enjoyable and relaxing times of my adult life. My physical state was so altered by the experience that my kids noticed “how relaxed and calm” I looked upon my return home.

I had a brief bout with sanity.

The second story is about my turn to practice without Pete around to help. A few days ago, our washing machine finally gave up the ghost after 13 years of faithful service. I did my due diligence and found the replacement machine I wanted at the right price. I went to the store to purchase the replacement and was told that the unit would be more than I expected and that I wouldn’t be able to take it home. I had to pick it up at another location 20 miles away,  2 or 3 days later.  I began to look for another machine gearing up to spend more money and not get the machine I wanted. But decided to listen rather than lead. I left empty handed.

When I got home, I browsed the website of the store I just left to check some facts and found that the machine I wanted was available for purchase on the website for $75 less than the in-store price and that it was available for immediate pickup from the store I just left! I purchased the unit online, printed the merchandise pickup order and had it installed in our laundry room within the hour. If I had listened to the salesperson and gone with a product I didn’t want at a price I didn’t want just so I wouldn’t be defeated by what I encountered at the store, I would have missed out.

If you’re like I am, these stories may strike you as silly, mystical nonsense at best and irrational at worst. Certainly the universe doesn’t talk back and those who stand around listening for voices in the wind have been the cause of much that is wrong with society. Of course, “listening to the universe” is a metaphor and I’m not suggesting that the world is somehow aware and has a will of it’s own. But I am suggesting that the metaphor unearths some important truths about epistemology. Namely, that our epistemic access to all the facts relevant for completely logical decision making and our power to completely control the world around us both are limited. There is an important philosophical truth here I think and one that has been made many, many times: truth and knowledge are distinct things. While we seek truth, we have to be cognizant of the fact that we’re not always able to reach it and that “being logical” is not in conflict with having a healthy acknowledgement that we sometimes have to let go and try to enjoy where life takes us.

Logic is one of the greatest gifts we’ve been given. But its not the only present under the tree.

Becoming a Better Knower
by paulp@philosophynews.com
20 Jan 2012 at 6:35am

The current period in the West has been called ?The Information Age.? We are inundated daily with data, some of which we have a responsibility to synthesize, understand, and do something with. As information and access to it grows at an inconsumable rate, what we would claim to know doesn?t necessarily grow with it and so few would want to say we live in a ?Knowledge Age.? Knowledge can be wily, unwieldy, opaque at times, and, at the end of the day elusive. Knowledge is a fundamental practical problem. Each of work hard every day to better understand the world around us and to find solutions to the problems we face so we can get better at life.

Because of this, philosophers have been been trying to better understand how knowledge works for centuries. In fact its been one of the perennial and perhaps defining earmarks of the discipline. Progress has been slow and comes in fits and starts but it does come. Every so often new philosophical innovations shed light on intractable problems and things move forward.

Dr. Jason Baehr of Loyola Marymount University is a philosopher who may be at the cusp of one of those innovations. Professor Baehr has spent the last decade working in the field of virtue epistemology that attempts to focus on the role and attitudes of the knower in the knowledge game rather than on the objects they seek to know. His new book by Oxford University Press, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology is a both a primer on this nascent discipline but also a substantial contribution to the field. We recently recorded a podcast with Dr. Baehr where we talked about his book, his work and the work being done in virtue epistemology in general.

That podcast started out as a written exchange which we?re publishing here. While the podcast goes into more depth on some of the questions you?ll see here, this interview covers more ground and we discuss topics we weren?t able to get to in the audio version. We encourage you to check out the podcast for a deeper exploration of what you read here.

Jason Baehr is Associate Professor of Philosophy at LMU and, in addition to the book, has written numerous papers and articles on virtue epistemology some of which are linked to below. We hope you enjoy our discussion. 

 

PN: Would you tell us a little about yourself as a philosopher? What are your interests and what was the genesis for the ideas you develop in this book?

Baehr: My interests lie mainly in the fields of epistemology and ethics. I?m especially interested in areas in which the two fields intersect, virtue epistemology being a prime example. Most of my work has been in the area of ?responsibilist? or character-based virtue epistemology, which is an approach to epistemology that gives a central and fundamental role to the notion of intellectual virtue and where intellectual virtues are understood as excellences of intellectual character like curiosity, inquisitiveness, carefulness and thoroughness in inquiry, fair-mindedness, open-mindedness, and intellectual courage, honesty, integrity, humility, rigor, and the like. The main idea for the book began with my dissertation, which was completed in 2002. While the book goes way beyond what was in the dissertation, the dissertation contained the seeds of several chapters.

PN: Linda Zagzebski is probably the most prominent philosopher working in the area of virtue epistemology. You disagree with her assessment of the scope of virtue epistemology as a general epistemology. What kind of feedback did you get from Linda on your thesis and how did she react to your proposal?

Baehr: It?s hard to overstate the importance of Linda?s 1996 book Virtues of the Mind. It put character-based virtue epistemology on the map. And it had and continues to have a major impact on my own work. That said, the book is very ambitious. It purports to offer a satisfactory virtue-based analysis of knowledge that can overcome the Gettier problem, resolve the dispute between internalists and externalists, rebut skepticism, and more. In my book, I take issue with Linda?s main theoretical proposals. In particular, I argue against her virtue-based analysis of knowledge and offer a competing theory of the nature and structure of intellectual character virtues. Over the years, Linda has been extremely generous with her time and conversation. But I have yet to learn what she thinks of the main critical proposals in my book. I may be finding out soon, however, as we?re co-authoring a debate on whether intellectually virtuous motives are required for knowledge that will be published in a revised edition of Blackwell?s Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.

PN: Let?s talk about your book. You define this in your book but can you summarize what virtue epistemology is and how it relates to "standard" epistemology in the analytic tradition?

Baehr: Put simply, virtue epistemology is an approach to epistemology that gives a central and fundamental role to reflection on intellectual virtues. I think of intellectual virtues as good intellectual character traits like the ones mentioned above. Some virtue epistemologists appeal to the concept of an intellectual virtue to address problems and questions within traditional or standard epistemology. I refer to this as Conservative VE. Others adopt a more immediate or direct focus on the concept of intellectual virtue?one that is separate or distinct from most traditional epistemological concerns and debates. In the book, I defend a weak version of Conservative VE. But I also defend Autonomous VE. The latter involves dealing with questions about the nature and structure of an intellectual virtue, the relation between intellectual virtues and various other cognitive and moral excellences, the character of individual virtues like open-mindedness and intellectual courage, and more. One attractive feature of Autonomous VE is that allows for progress in our understanding of some of the more important dimensions of the cognitive life without having to solve or settle various debates in traditional epistemology, at least some of which appear to be intractable.

PN: You claim that your book is largely an ?internalist? account of intellectual virtue and that a virtue-based epistemology could complement (though probably not replace) traditional epistemic accounts. If knowledge acquisition is at least in part of product of the practice intellectual virtue and/or internalist, does this prima facie rule out the possibility of knowledge for non-human animals (assuming they have cognitive lives aimed at truth) or knowledge for small children or those with severe cognitive disorders?

Baehr: Yes, if you hold that something like an exercise of intellectual character virtues is necessary for knowledge, then it looks as though you must deny that non-human animals and children are capable of acquiring knowledge. Even worse, you must deny the possibility of what I refer to in Chapter 3 of the book as ?passive knowledge,? which is knowledge that is a product of the relatively brute, mechanistic, or untutored functioning of a person?s cognitive faculties. Putative instances of the latter include things like my knowledge that I?m conscious, that I don?t have a splitting headache, that the room I?m in is well lit, and so on. This is knowledge the acquisition of which does not appear to involve any kind of characterological motivation, let alone motivation that could reasonably be thought of as intellectually ?virtuous? in any robust sense. For these and other reasons, in Chapter 3 of the book I argue against the project of trying to define knowledge in terms of intellectual virtue.

While I reject a virtue-based analysis of knowledge, I defend an ?internalist? account of intellectual virtue. That is, I argue that the traits in question are intellectual virtues on account of certain qualities that are internal to the agent who possesses them. This includes certain attitudes or motives like a love of knowledge; it also includes certain beliefs. On my view, the relevant traits are not intellectual virtues on account of ?external? factors like epistemic reliability. The latter, I argue, are too susceptible to luck to form the basis of intellectual character excellence.

PN: You argue in chapters 4 and 5 that weak conservative virtue epistemology is preferred over other, stronger accounts but does not require an overhaul of traditional epistemology. Can you summarize your view and why you hold it?

Baehr: While I think that the concept of intellectual virtue can?t form the basis of a plausible analysis of knowledge and therefore doesn?t merit ?pride of place? within traditional epistemological discussions, it doesn?t follow that this concept is irrelevant to traditional epistemology. Indeed, in Chapters 4 and 5, I argue that the notion of intellectual virtue is importantly related to both reliabilism and evidentialism (two views of the nature of knowledge or epistemic justification), albeit in a relatively secondary or peripheral way. In Chapter 4, I argue that reliabilists need recourse to the concept of an intellectual character virtue in order to make sense of much of the knowledge that we as human beings care about most. In Chapter 5, I raise a problem for evidentialist theories of justification and propose an intellectual virtue ?patch? for the problem. In neither case does my conclusion require thinking of an exercise of intellectual character virtues as a requirement for knowledge or justification. But these chapters are meant to show that traditional epistemology can?t do without the notion of intellectual virtue. Accordingly, they represent a defense of a weaker version of Conservative VE.

PN: In chapter 5 you discuss the relationship intellectual virtue to evidentialist theories of justification. You argue that in cases where evidence would seem to be a relevant ground for justification, there are times when evidence alone is not sufficient and would require bolstering by an intellectual virtue. You give an example of two people (George and Gerry) who are aware of some evidence that secondhand smoke is not dangerous but unaware-- because of laziness or a lack of curiosity--of the widely available evidence that it is. Because of this, the evidence either does have should not be said to justify his belief. You write, "Despite whatever justi?cation the beliefs of George and Gerry may enjoy, there is indeed an additional intuitive and e-relevant sense in which these beliefs are unjusti?ed. For while these beliefs are well supported by the agents? evidence, this evidence clearly is not what it should be." (Page 86). But the "ought" in this case seems very squishy. What is the basis for determining what intellectual responsibilities George and Gerry carry in this case?

Baehr: You?re right that I don?t say a whole lot about the relevant notion of ?ought?; and in fact I think my usage of that and other deontological terms is dispensable. The important point is that there?s something epistemically defective about how the characters in question inquire and that this defect transfers to their beliefs, such that the beliefs are not epistemically justified in any interesting or significant sense. I think this much is pretty obvious or intuitive. That said, I agree that a more comprehensive reply would include an explanation of what exactly the defect is and why it?s a defect. I offer at least the basis of this kind of reply in other chapters (esp. Chs. 6-9). But it?s not something that comes in Chapter 5 itself. For some further probing of this and related kinds of cases, I refer the reader to the podcast.

PN: Similarly, in analyzing BonJour's position, you highlight his idea that "a belief appears to be well supported but only because the person in question is suppressing or distorting a potential defeater." (The dogmatism and bias objection). There are some knowledge domains that we seem to be responsible for but the evidence that we may need to make virtuous decisions are not ?live options? for us. The evidence we need to consider may be too complex or take too much time to consider or might be beyond our intellectual ken. Yet the evidence we do have might support a false conclusion. Do you see this as a real problem and if so, how does a virtue-epistemic approach treat this issue?

Baehr: I think the case you describe here is importantly different from the George and Gerry cases. I wouldn?t consider a person?s failure to conduct further inquiry based on inability or lack of time or resources as a potential defeater. Failing to conduct further inquiry into a topic because you don?t have the chops required for understanding the literature on the topic is very different from failing to inquiry because you?re close-minded, dogmatic, or the like. It?s the latter sort of defect that threatens to undermine justification and that I?m concerned with in Chapter 5.

Nevertheless, difficult questions remain about the requirements of intellectual virtue. For instance, from a virtue epistemological standpoint, how am I to know which topics or subject matters are most worthy of my (limited) time and epistemic resources? And how am I to determine when I?ve investigated or inquired about a particular subject matter sufficiently? These are indeed difficult questions. My chapters on open-mindedness (Ch. 8) and intellectual courage (Ch. 9) shed some light on how they might be answered, but I don?t have a fully worked out reply. I do think this is one area in which the notion of wisdom is important in epistemology. For it is very plausible to think that a (maximally) intellectually virtuous person will have a sense of which subject matters are most worth learning about and how best to apportion her time and cognitive resources, and that she?ll have this sense on account of a kind of epistemic wisdom. In recent years, a number of epistemologists have begun turning their attention to the concept of wisdom. As this literature develops, I suspect it will shed important light on some of the issues you?re asking about.

PN: You write, "talents differ from intellectual character virtues in essentially the same ways as faculties. For again, talents are largely innate; they are part of our inborn or native cognitive equipment. Intellectual virtues, by contrast, are cultivated?" What is the relation between intellectual virtue (which implies one has a certain amount of control over one's actions) and natural capacities and developed temperaments (which one has little to no control over)? Many people seem to lack a natural ability or at least a natural disposition to be "studious" and digest deep and complex arguments or analyze complex scenarios and draw reasonable conclusions. Does this have any implications for how intellectually virtuous such a person can be?

Baehr: In Chapter 2 of the book, I distinguish intellectual character virtues from intellectual faculties (e.g. memory and vision), talents (e.g. intelligence or IQ), temperaments (e.g. being ?naturally? studious or open-minded), and skills (e.g. technical proficiency in performing mathematical computations or logical proofs). I argue that intellectual virtues are importantly related to and intertwined with these other cognitive excellences but that they are also fundamentally different from them. Intellectual character virtues differ from things like cognitive faculties and talents on the ground that they are acquired rather than innate; they also have a personal normative dimension that talents and faculties lack (one can be very bright and have the memory of an elephant while nevertheless being a rotten person; not so for one who possesses the full range of intellectual character virtues). Intellectual temperaments are like Aristotle?s ?natural virtues? and as such bear a closer a resemblance to intellectual character virtues. However, temperaments are also ?natural? in way that intellectual character virtues are not; and their possession (unlike that of intellectual character virtues) does not require any kind of reflective endorsement or understanding. Intellectual skills are active in a way that resembles intellectual character virtues; however, they lack a kind of personal or motivational dimension that is central to intellectual virtues. This is, in any case, a very brief (and incomplete) sketch of the argument in Chapter 2.

Concerning the second part of your question, I think you?re right that people often have natural dispositions or temperaments that resemble and make it easier to acquire the corresponding character virtues. This illustrates one form of epistemic luck or one way in which luck figures into the possession of virtuous intellectual character.

PN: There seems to be a bearing of the source of "virtues" on all aspects of the reliabilist account. For example: having good eyesight is not something we have control over. It is at least partially a product of our DNA and not under our direct or even indirect control. Similarly, desiring truth over money may not be a product of character virtue but of our DNA or personality type or whatever frames our dispositions but may not be under our control. In other words, people are diverse and some are disposed to be studious and intellectually curious and careful. Others are not. If a person is not naturally so disposed, should we say that she is epistemically blameworthy? In contrast, if someone isn?t naturally intellectually curious would you want to say of that person that they are intellectually vicious in some way? Are they blameworthy for not being inquisitive particularly if we understand dispositions as being partially outside of our control?

Baehr: The notions of praise and blame don?t enter in a very central way into my accounts of intellectual virtue and vice (I suspect these notions are derivative from what I would consider the real virtue-making features of the relevant traits). But your question seems ultimately to be getting at the role of luck in the acquisition of intellectual character virtues. What if someone has the ill fortune of not being inclined toward curiosity or studiousness? Does this mean that she can?t be intellectually virtuous? I think the answer is no. She may be at a disadvantage or be challenged in a way that a person who is naturally studious and curious is not, but it doesn?t follow that she?ll be incapable of acquiring these virtues at least to some extent. Some might take issue with thinking of intellectual virtue formation as lucky in any sense. I don?t. But this isn?t to say that I think the possession of intellectual virtues can be entirely lucky. For this would, in my view, prevent intellectual virtues from contributing to the ?personal intellectual worth? of their possessor. Thus you might say that being intellectually virtuous is more concerned with making good use of your cognitive temperaments and endowment than with what those things are in the first place.

PN: The idea that intellectual virtues contribute to their possessor?s ?personal intellectual worth? is central to your account of intellectual virtue. Could you say a bit more about what this notion amounts to and how it differs from other more familiar kinds of epistemic or moral value?

Baehr: On my view, a character trait is an intellectual virtue only if it contributes to its possessor?s ?personal intellectual worth,? that is, only if it makes its possessor intellectually good or better qua person. Typically, when we call someone a ?good person? we do so in light of the person?s possession of certain moral virtues like generosity or compassion or honesty. However, there?s also an intellectual or epistemic dimension to personal excellence or worth. To get at it, it can be helpful to think first about more familiar forms of epistemic evaluation. I might, for instance, praise a person?s perfect vision or impeccable memory or extremely high IQ. In doing so, however, I would not really be making a judgment about this person qua person. Someone could have perfect vision, an impeccable memory, and an extraordinary IQ but still be a rotten person through and through.

By contrast, consider a person who is open-minded, fair-minded, and intellectually honest, and whose love of knowledge and understanding compels her to think and inquire in ways that careful, thorough, and rigorous. This person would embody a kind of intellectual or epistemic excellence. But it would be a kind of excellence different from the more impersonal or mechanistic form of excellence embodied by good memory or good vision. It likely would make good sense to think of this person as good or better qua person on account her open-mindedness, love of knowledge, intellectual carefulness, and so on. This suggests that there?s a sphere of epistemic excellence or worth that lies between more familiar but impersonal forms of epistemic excellence, on the one hand, and personal but strictly moral forms of excellence, on the other. Unfortunately, this evaluative dimension has largely been ignored by epistemologists and ethicists. But it?s central, I think, to a proper understanding of the basis of intellectual virtue.

PN: You define open mindedness in terms of one?s willingness to consider seriously the cognitive position distinct from the one she presently holds. You say that the open minded person need not consider the distinct cognitive position as a live option for her in many cases but this requirement would hold in others. Can you explain?

Baehr: Assuming that by a ?live option? you mean something like a view or position that one is capable of taking seriously or of thinking of as true or possibly true, then, yes, I think the virtue of open-mindedness can require that a person give consideration to views that aren?t live options for him. This is partly because there may be cases in which a position isn?t a live option for a person but should be (e.g. where a position seems ?beyond the pale? but only because the person in question is thinking in a dogmatic or narrow-minded way).

But it is also a function of the fact that some subject matters or issues seem to be more epistemically significant than others, such that getting things right relative to these issues is especially important from an epistemic standpoint. The result is that if, relative to one of these subject matters, I?m fully and reasonably convinced that P, it may be incumbent upon me to consider an argument for not-P, even if not-P is presently not a live option for me. Again, getting things right relative to P might be so epistemically momentous that I might need to consider the case for not-P even if at present I don?t see how not-P could be true. This is another case in which it is at least tempting to make an appeal to something like the notion of phronesis or practical wisdom. As such it further underscores the importance of thinking about wisdom and related concepts in epistemology.

PN: Can one be said to be intellectually courageous in defending seemingly outrageous or indefensible claims? For example, some have lampooned a view attributed to Alvin Plantinga: explaining natural evil in terms of the free will of demons in order to place the moral onus of all evil on free will. While such a view may be consistent with an overall philosophy, the defense appears to many to be both unfounded and irrelevant to the nature of the problem and ultimately un-provable. One could argue that such a position threatens the sincerity of any philosopher who holds it (at best, at worst his or her competency). At what point does defending a position become less a matter of intellectual courage simply become intellectual intractability or stubbornness (apparent vices)?

Baehr: In Plantinga?s case, he is (if I?m remembering correctly) just trying to show that the co-existence of God and natural evil is possible. I think the hypothesis in question probably does the work he wants it to. Thus I?m inclined to attribute people?s unease with the hypothesis to the rather low bar he?s trying to clear. (In other words, I think the typical reaction is that while such a hypothesis might be possible, it is overwhelmingly unlikely.) Nevertheless, I think the specific question you ask is a good one. My own view (which I can?t elaborate on or defend here) is that a person?s holding fast to a particular belief in the face of certain challenges becomes stubborn rather than courageous if the person lacks good reason to believe that holding fast to the belief will be helpful for securing or maintaining the truth. This is because I think of intellectual virtues as involving (very roughly) a disposition to engage in certain forms of cognitive activity (e.g. maintaining a belief) out of a reasonable sense that doing so will be helpful for achieving or maintaining a true belief. I elaborate on this in Chapters 7-9 of my book and in a forthcoming paper titled ?The Cognitive Demands of Intellectual Virtue.?

PN: There?s a clear resemblance between what you describe as intellectual virtues and what philosophers have typically thought of as moral virtues. This is evident in some of the relevant terminology: for instance you talk a lot about intellectual courage, intellectual honesty, and so on. So, how exactly do you understand the relationship between intellectual character virtues and what we typically think of as moral virtues?

Baehr: This is a very difficult question. I had hoped to defend a fairly straightforward answer to it in the book. But when I got to writing the relevant chapter (which ended up as a lengthy appendix) I found myself losing a grip on the notion of ?moral,? which of course made it very difficult to articulate the distinction between intellectual and moral virtues. One could attempt to answer the question by invoking a very broad sense of the moral or morality, with the result that the intellectual virtues turn out to be a subset of moral virtues. But this account fails to do justice to the idea that, say, a knowledge-loving academic who also happens to be abusive toward his spouse, children, and neighbors could be intellectually virtuous but a complete failure morally. In the book, I settle on a conception of the moral according to which ?moral? is more or less synonymous with ?others-regarding.?

The resulting distinction between intellectual and moral virtues turns out to be fairly complex, since the relevant notion of ?intellectual? is not symmetrical with that of ?moral.? Intellectual virtues, I argue, are excellences of personal character aimed at distinctively epistemic goods like knowledge, truth, and understanding. Moral virtues are excellences of personal character aimed at others? well-being. The difficulty is that some intellectual virtues (e.g. intellectual generosity) aim at others? share in the epistemic goods and thus at others? well-being, making them intellectual and moral virtues. On my view, then, ?moral? is symmetrical with ?prudential,? not ?intellectual.? And ?intellectual? is symmetrical with, say, ?aesthetic? or ?hedonistic? or ?spiritual,? not ?moral.? I wish the overall picture were cleaner than it is. But in the end it was the best that I could do.

PN: There is work being done to subsume epistemology under cognitive science and brain science (Dennett?s work is one example among many). Is virtue epistemology in principle tangential to this effort or could virtue epistemology be developed in a way consistent with these research programs?

Baehr: I?m not sure about the relevance of neuroscience to virtue epistemology. But I do think that some work in cognitive psychology is very relevant and useful. The intellectual virtues are robust psychological traits. Empirical studies of these traits can help virtue epistemologists develop and refine their accounts of what intellectual virtues are or involve. I?ve found some of the work in positive psychology to be helpful in just this way. That said, I think that such work will always be driven by a prior conception of what the intellectual virtue or virtues in question amount to (cognitive scientists can begin studying intellectual courage in particular subjects, say, only if they have a prior conception of what intellectual courage is). Some such conceptions are bound to be better than others. And I don?t think the qualitative differences between these conceptions will be capable of being adjudicated on empirical grounds. Thus I think that some kind of conceptual or reasonably a priori philosophical reflection on the matter is indispensable.

PN: In the final chapter of the book, you discuss Jonathan Kvanvig?s suggestion that epistemologists abandon the ?modern or Cartesian? epistemic project (traditional epistemology) and move towards a virtue-based approach if they are to fulfill the lofty goals set out by epistemology broadly speaking. What is the essence of his argument and your rejection of it?

Baehr: Kvanvig?s The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Epistemology (1992) is a very fine and underappreciated book. It?s very sophisticated and comprehensive. I think it probably appeared before its time (it?s out of print now, if I?m not mistaken). In any case, one of Kvanvig?s central claims in the book is that traditional or Cartesian epistemology should be abandoned in favor of an approach that focuses on intellectual character, virtue, and related concepts in a more direct or immediate way (thus he defends a strong version of Autonomous VE). I think this goes too far. While I?m all for Autonomous VE, I think much (though not all) of traditional epistemology is well-motivated. Kvanvig?s main misgiving about traditional epistemology is a bit hard to pin down, but it appears to be that traditional epistemology is not sufficiently action-guiding. He views it as mired in technicality and theoretical dead ends and thus as unhelpful for guiding or regulating our intellectual lives.

In Chapter 10, I raise a couple of objections to Kvanvig?s argument. First, I argue that part of the point of epistemology is simply to provide an accurate explanatory account of important epistemic concepts and that this in turn is likely to result in a fair amount of technical detail and abstraction. While this may, to some extent, detract from the action-guiding force of epistemological theories, it doesn?t follow that these theories should be rejected. Second, I argue that traditional epistemology is not, in fact, bereft of action-guiding power. On the contrary, it sheds significant (if incomplete) light on what is ultimately significant from an epistemic standpoint and on concepts, principles, and criteria a grasp of which can indeed play an important role in guiding or regulating our attempts to achieve the epistemic good.

PN: You state at the end of the book that virtue epistemology may provide insights that can come to the aid of general epistemological problems. Are you seeing a bigger adoption of virtue epistemology by epistemologists in general and do you have further projects you?d like to pursue in this space?

Baehr: I?m not optimistic about the stronger version of Conservative VE. I do hope, however, that traditionally minded epistemologists will continue to explore connections between the concepts of intellectual character and virtue and the subject matter of traditional epistemology. Thus I?m fully supportive of weaker versions of Conservative VE. My main interests lie with Autonomous VE. I think a great deal of work remains to be done concerning the nature and structure of intellectual virtues, their relation to other cognitive and moral excellences, and their role and importance to the life of the mind. One exciting area in this regard is ?applied virtue epistemology,? which examines the importance of intellectual virtue possession within certain specific human domains or practices like science, law, and education. I?m especially interested in the importance of intellectual character and virtue to our conception of the aims or goals of education. It seems obvious to me that part of what we want or should want for our students is growth in intellectual character virtues.

Interestingly, however, almost all the talk within educational theory about character or virtue pertains to civic or (narrowly) moral virtue. There is no widely recognized conception of intellectual character or of character as it relates to educational goals like knowledge and understanding. This is very odd, puzzling, and unfortunate. I?d like to see educational theorists and virtue epistemologists begin to converse with each other. As a step in this direction, I?ll soon be writing a paper titled ?Intellectual Virtues and the Goals of Education? for special issue of the Journal of the Philosophy of Education.

Other Resources:

Listen to the podcast of our discussion.

Get the book!

The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology
Oxford University Press has made the first chapter of the book available as a sample. You can download that here.
The OUP website for the book.

Select papers by Dr. Baehr:

"The Structure of Open-Mindedness"

"Character, Reliability, and Virtue Epistemology"

"The Cognitive Demands of Intellectual Virtue"

"Epistemic Malevolence"

"Two Kinds of Wisdom"

Wanna Be A Philosopher?
by paulp@philosophynews.com
19 Jan 2012 at 1:05am

Here?s some guidance and resources that might help.

By Aidan McGlynn, a postdoctoral research fellow and convener of the Self-Knowledge pilot project at the Northern Institute of Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen.

CFP: Extended Deadline for APT Conference
by paulp@philosophynews.com
19 Jan 2012 at 12:44am

THE NINETEENTH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP-CONFERENCE ON TEACHING PHILOSOPHY
St. Edward?s University
Austin, Texas
July 25 - July 29, 2012

Proposals for interactive workshops and panels related to teaching and learning philosophy at any
educational level are welcome. W e especially encourage workshops and panels on the following topics:

innovative and successful teaching strategies professional issues connected to teaching how work in other disciplines can improve the teaching of philosophy engaging students outside the classroom innovative uses of instructional technologies the challenge of teaching in new settings methods to improve student learning

Send Submissions, via email, to Russell Marcus: rmarcus1@hamilton.edu. Deadline Extended to: February 9, 2012.

More information at the APT website.

Job Opening at University of Adelaide
by paulp@philosophynews.com
17 Jan 2012 at 7:55pm

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Adelaide
School of Humanities (Ref: 17177)

The School of Humanities at The University of Adelaide invites applications for the tenurable post of Lecturer (Level B) in Philosophy. The area of specialization for this vacancy is open.

Continuing position available from 1 July 2012.
Salary: (Level B) $80,019 per annum, plus an employer superannuation contribution of 17% applies.

Closing date 24/02/2012*
Applicants are asked to address the knowledge and experience and qualifications sections within the position description.
Please find here the link to the advert, further information and also the
selection criteria.

Email applications to georgina.deally@adelaide.edu.au
Contact: A/Professor Jennifer A. McMahon
Email: jenny.mcmahon@adelaide.edu.au
Phone: +61 8 8313 5296

Bellingham Lectures in Philosophy and Religion
by paulp@philosophynews.com
10 Jan 2012 at 8:35am

This coming spring, Western Washington University will be hosting the second annual Bellingham Lectures in Philosophy and Religion with guest speakers Dr. Jeffrey Schloss (The Evolution of Religion Project) and Dr. Michael Murray (editor of Reason for the Hope Within). The project was kicked off in 2011 by Dr. Alvin Plantinga who gave lectures titled, God and Evolution: Where the Conflict Really Lies, and Does Science Show that Miracles Can?t Happen? Philosophy News interviewed Dr. Plantinga during that event.

The 2012 program will feature two lectures on the Bellingham campus:

February 21, 7pm: ?Evolutionary Accounts of Belief in God? ? Does biology explain away God?

February 23, 7pm: ?Evolution and the Problem of Evil? ? Is evolutionary suffering incompatible with a good God?

The lectures will take place at the Pacific Arts Center (PAC) on the campus of Western Washington University and will be streamed live at 7pm PST both evenings through the BLPR website. Philosophy News will be attending the event and we hope to get some time with Drs. Schloss and Murray. Check back after the event for more information.

Big Questions

For more information, visit http://www.blpr.org or email info@blpr.org.

A Science of Religious Orientation?
by paulp@philosophynews.com
10 Jan 2012 at 7:01am

I?ve long been interested in how natural dispositions, both mental and physical, incline one towards or away from religion. By ?religion? I don?t merely mean formal religion but I mean that type of mindset one would call religious. People can be religious about a whole host of things including sports, the environment, money, sex, and of course theistic systems involving belief in God and an afterlife. While it seems trivially true that most humans are religious about something when defined in the broad sense, I have been exploring the idea that there is a ?type? of religious inclination that disposes people towards formal religious expression as expressed by the worlds religions in the narrow sense.

In an interesting article on Epiphenom, Tomas Rees looks at a study by John Sasaki involving religious priming in order to see if certain genetic traits have an correlation to certain types of religious behaviors after being primed with religious ideas. Rees concludes:

?All this goes to show that the relationship between genetics and religion is not at all straightforward. This particular gene variant seems to make people more susceptible to environmental influences - whether religious or otherwise.?

This science is fairly young but I expect it will be a growing area of study and one that will fascinating to follow.

Post here.

CFA for Workshop of the Experimental Philosophy Group
by paulp@philosophynews.com
8 Jan 2012 at 8:31am

Experimental Philosophy Group UK invites the submission of 500-word abstracts for 45-minute presentations or poster presentations on the subject of ?Intuitions, Experiments and Philosophy? for their upcoming workshop. Keynote presentations will be given by Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona) and Simone Schnall (University of Cambridge).

More information here.

Moral Philosopher?s ?Shell Marriage?
by paulp@philosophynews.com
6 Jan 2012 at 8:01am

A moral philosophy professor who apparently married a woman 17 years years ago to get into the United States, lived with her just 3 months then divorced her 10 years later without letting her know.

Article here.

 

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
This channel provides information about new and revised entries as they are published in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Parenthood and Procreation
by Elizabeth Brake and Joseph Millum
27 Jan 2012 at 3:16am
[Revised entry by Elizabeth Brake and Joseph Millum on January 26, 2012. Changes to: 0] The ethics of parenthood and procreation apply not only to daily acts of decision-making by parents and prospective procreators, but also to law, public policy, and medicine. Two recent social and technological shifts make this topic especially pressing. First, changing family demographics in North America and Europe mean that children are increasingly reared in blended families, by single...
Margaret Fell
by Jacqueline Broad
27 Jan 2012 at 1:50am
[New Entry by Jacqueline Broad on January 26, 2012.] On the strength of her 1666 pamphlet, Womens Speaking Justified, the Quaker writer Margaret Fell has been hailed as a feminist pioneer. In this short tract, Fell puts forward several arguments in favour of women's preaching. She asserts the spiritual equality of the sexes, she appeals to female exempla in the Bible, and she reinterprets key scriptural passages that appear to...
Metaethics
by Geoff Sayre-McCord
27 Jan 2012 at 1:30am
[Revised entry by Geoff Sayre-McCord on January 26, 2012. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html] Metaethics is the attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice. As such, it counts within its domain a broad range of questions and puzzles, including: Is morality more a matter of taste than truth? Are moral standards culturally relative? Are there moral facts? If there are moral facts,...
Communitarianism
by Daniel Bell
26 Jan 2012 at 4:06am
[Revised entry by Daniel Bell on January 25, 2012. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, Internet resources] Modern-day communitarianism began in the upper reaches of Anglo-American academia in the form of a critical reaction to John Rawls' landmark 1971 book A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971). Drawing primarily upon the insights of Aristotle and Hegel, political philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer disputed Rawls' assumption that the...
Aristotle's Natural Philosophy
by Istvan Bodnar
17 Jan 2012 at 5:54am
[Revised entry by Istvan Bodnar on January 16, 2012. Changes to: Bibliography, Internet resources, notes.html] Aristotle had a lifelong interest in the study of nature. He investigated a variety of different topics, ranging from general issues like motion, causation, place and time, to systematic explorations and explanations of natural phenomena across different kinds of natural entities. These different inquiries are integrated into the framework of a single overarching enterprise describing the...
Omnipotence
by Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz
13 Jan 2012 at 5:47am
[Revised entry by Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz on January 12, 2012. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography] Omnipotence is maximal power. Maximal greatness (or perfection) includes omnipotence. According to traditional Western theism, God is maximally great (or perfect), and therefore is omnipotent. Omnipotence seems puzzling, even paradoxical, to many philosophers. They wonder, for example, whether God can create a spherical cube, or make a stone so massive that he cannot move it. Is there a consistent analysis of...
Authority
by Tom Christiano
12 Jan 2012 at 3:02am
[Revised entry by Tom Christiano on January 11, 2012. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography] When is political authority legitimate? This is one of the fundamental questions of political philosophy. Depending on how one understands political authority this question may be the same as, when is coercion by the state legitimate? Or, when we do have duties to obey the state? Or, when and who has a right to rule through the state?...
Zeno of Elea
by John Palmer
12 Jan 2012 at 12:49am
[Revised entry by John Palmer on January 11, 2012. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography] Zeno of Elea, 5th c. B.C.E. thinker, is known exclusively for propounding a number of ingenious paradoxes. The most famous of these purport to show that motion is impossible by bringing to light apparent or latent contradictions in ordinary assumptions regarding its occurrence. Zeno also argued against the commonsense assumption that there are many things by showing in various ways how it, too,...
Dispositions
by Sungho Choi and Michael Fara
6 Jan 2012 at 1:49am
[Revised entry by Sungho Choi and Michael Fara on January 5, 2012. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, supplement.html] A glass has certain dispositions, for example the disposition to shatter when struck. But what is this disposition? It seems on the one hand to be a perfectly real property, a genuine respect of similarity common to glasses, china cups, and anything else fragile. Yet on the other hand, the glass's disposition seems mysterious, 'ethereal' (as Goodman (1954) put it) in a way that, say,...
Evolutionary Epistemology
by Michael Bradie and William Harms
6 Jan 2012 at 1:14am
[Revised entry by Michael Bradie and William Harms on January 5, 2012. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, Internet resources] Evolutionary Epistemology is a naturalistic approach to epistemology, which emphasizes the importance of natural selection in two primary roles. In the first role, selection is the generator and maintainer of the reliability of our senses and cognitive mechanisms, as well as the "fit" between those mechanisms and the world. In the second role, trial and error learning and the evolution of scientific theories are...
Inheritance Systems
by Ehud Lamm
5 Jan 2012 at 7:49am
[New Entry by Ehud Lamm on January 4, 2012.] Organisms inherit various kinds of developmental information and cues from their parents. The study of inheritance systems is aimed at identifying and classifying the various mechanisms and processes of heredity, the types of hereditary information that is passed on by each, the functional interaction between the different systems, and the evolutionary consequences of these properties....
Quotation
by Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore
5 Jan 2012 at 1:14am
[Revised entry by Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore on January 4, 2012. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography] Starting with Frege, the semantics (and pragmatics) of quotation has received a steady flow of attention over the last one hundred years. It has not, however, been subject to the same kind of intense debate and scrutiny as, for example, both the semantics of definite descriptions and propositional attitude verbs. Many philosophers probably share Davidson's experience: 'When I was...
Hasdai Crescas
by Shalom Sadik
4 Jan 2012 at 8:24am
[New Entry by Shalom Sadik on January 4, 2012.] Rabbi Hasdai Crescas (ca. 1340 - 1410/11) was the head of the Jewish community of Aragon, and in some ways all of Hispanic Jewry, during one of its most critical periods. Crescas was one of the leading rabbinic authorities of his time,[1] the political leader of the Jews of Aragon, and a philosophical polemicist against Christianity. As one of the main medieval Jewish philosophers,...
Teleological Theories of Mental Content
by Karen Neander
4 Jan 2012 at 6:37am
[Revised entry by Karen Neander on January 3, 2012. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography] Teleological theories of mental content try to explain the contents of mental representations by appealing to a teleological notion of function. Take, for example, the thought that blossoms are forming. On a representational theory of thought, this thought involves a representation of blossoms forming. A theory of content aims among other things to tell us why this representation has that content; it...
Epistemic Paradoxes
by Roy Sorensen
31 Dec 2011 at 6:44am
[Revised entry by Roy Sorensen on December 30, 2011. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography Changes to: Main text, Bibliography] Epistemic paradoxes are riddles that turn on the concept of knowledge (episteme is Greek for knowledge). Typically, there are conflicting, well-credentialed answers to these questions (or pseudo-questions). Thus the riddle immediately informs us of an inconsistency. In the long run, the riddle goads and guides us into correcting at least one deep error - if not directly about...
 

ephilosopher.com is a web community dedicated to philosophical thinking.
Philosophy, news, research and discussion

Public Reason
by eat38447@obu.edu (danieleaton)
9 Nov 2008 at 9:38pm
Public Reason "is a new blog for political philosophers and theorists. The purpose of the blog is to create an open forum for the academic political philosophy and theory community where we can discuss our common work. Academic blogging has undergone a remarkable growth lately. A group blog, in particular, can be used as a tool to continue the conversations that begin on the journal pages and in the conference halls. There are two types of user status at Public Reason: participants and members. Participants have the ability to comment on posts. To register as a participant, you must be affiliated with an academic institution in some way. For instance, present or former students of political thought may register and participate in discussion. To register as a participant at the site, please follow this link. Please keep in mind that your registration may take some time to be approved.
Common Law Theory
by eat38447@obu.edu (danieleaton)
24 Aug 2008 at 12:24pm
Douglas E. Edlin (ed.), Common Law Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 247pp., $80.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780521846424. W.J. Waluchow: ". . .if common law is case law, precisely where in legal cases are common law rules to be found? Among the most theoretically troubling features of such rules -- assuming that they do indeed exist -- is that they are not canonically formulated in the manner of statutory rules. Judges seldom formulate anything remotely like what we normally think of as a rule when they decide cases. Rather, they explain and defend their decisions by citing reasons, doctrines, precedents, and so on. Often they cite what appear to be moral, political and social considerations. But these are not the kinds of things we normally think of as legal rules; rather they seem to be factors one could draw on to support the adoption, application, alteration or rejection of such rules. And so our question remains: where precisely do we locate common law rules? And then there is this peculiar feature of common law rules: they are quite often capable of revision in the very act of application by a judge, a respect in which they seem quite unlike, say, statutory rules which judges are not free to change. How can rules, revisable at point of application, be intelligently thought of as legally "binding" on a decision-maker? Indeed, can they sensibly be said to be rules at all? . . ." more
The Emotional Construction of Morals
by eat38447@obu.edu (danieleaton)
22 Jun 2008 at 11:08am
Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals, Oxford University Press, 2007, 334pp., $60.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780199283019. Ronald de Sousa, University of Toronto: "Is the good a projection of our preferences, or are our preferences correct or incorrect according to their correspondence to some objective good, independent of our minds? The question goes back to Plato's Euthyphro. There have been major hitters on both sides, and it is one of the many scandals of philosophy that the debate drags on. Jesse Prinz's brilliant new book is a detailed and convincing defense of a fresh variant of the projectionist view, in which emotional responses, particularly approbation and disapprobation, constitute the core content of moral judgments. The view is refined in such a way as to embrace the possibility of moral truth, and answer a large array of objections. Its relativist consequences are embraced, and independently supported with a wide range of psychological and anthropological evidence. Prinz shows, however, that even full fledged relativism does not exclude viable notions of moral debate and moral progress." more
Conference: "Genres, Categories, and Concepts in Aesthetics and the Philosoph...
by eat38447@obu.edu (danieleaton)
24 May 2008 at 9:20pm
"Genres, Categories, and Concepts in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art" May 16-18, 2008 Indiana University, Bloomington � This conference will investigate the particular roles of various types of categorization in the production, experience, and appreciation of works of art. Specific topics include: � � � * the legitimacy of cross�categorial comparison of artworks � � * gender in the horror genre: "feminist final girls" � � * Collingwood on the distinction between art and craft � � * generic resetting in rock covers � � * Herder on sculpture � � * nuance as a category�independent aesthetic property � � * Schopenhauer on genres that matter�: tragedy and still life � � * comics as literary/visual hybrid � � � � � Amy Coplan (Cal State, Fullerton) � � � � Nicholas Diehl (University of California, Davis) � � � � Jonathan Friday (Kent University, UK) � � � � Ted Gracyk (Minnesota State, Moorhead) � � � � Matthew Kieran (Leeds University, UK) � � � � Aaron Meskin (Leeds University, UK) � � � � Michael Morgan (Indiana University) � � � � Alex Neill (University of Southampton, UK) � � � � Henry Pratt (Marist College, USA) � � � � Aaron Ridley (University of Southampton, UK) � � � � Michael Rings (Indiana University) � � � � Tiger Roholt (Indiana University of Pennsylvania) � � � � Sandy Shapshay (Indiana University) � � � � Joshua Shaw (Penn State, Erie) � � � � Rachel Zuckert (Northwestern University, USA) � Visit conference website at:�[link=hyperlink url]http://www.indiana.edu/~aesthete/[/link] For further information or registration, contact: mrings@indiana.edu � Sponsored by the College Arts Humanities Institute and the Indiana University Department of Philosophy. Co-sponsored by the Indiana University Departments of Communication and Culture, English, Germanic Studies, Spanish and Portuguese, West European Studies, and the Fundamental Studio Area of the School of Fine Arts � ��� [[b]Submitted by Michael Rings[/b]]
New Book About the Definition and Meaning of "Privacy"
by eat38447@obu.edu (danieleaton)
1 May 2008 at 11:06pm
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY by Daniel J. Solove (Harvard University Press, 2008) From the book jacket: Privacy is one of the most important concepts of our time, yet it is also one of the most elusive. As rapidly changing technology makes information increasingly available, scholars, activists, and policymakers have struggled to define privacy, with many conceding that the task is virtually impossible.

In this concise and lucid book, Daniel J. Solove offers a comprehensive overview of the difficulties involved in discussions of privacy and ultimately provides a provocative resolution. He argues that no single definition can be workable, but rather that there are multiple forms of privacy, related to one another by family resemblances. His theory bridges cultural differences and addresses historical changes in views on privacy. Drawing on a broad array of interdisciplinary sources, Solove sets forth a framework for understanding privacy that provides clear, practical guidance for engaging with relevant issues.

Understanding Privacy will be an essential introduction to long-standing debates and an invaluable resource for crafting laws and policies about surveillance, data mining, identity theft, state involvement in reproductive and marital decisions, and other pressing contemporary matters concerning privacy. Daniel Solove offers a unique, challenging account of how to think better about-- and of-- privacy. No scholar in America is more committed to demystifying "the right to privacy". --Anita L. Allen, University of Pennsylvania Law School

Art, Emotion and Ethics
by eat38447@obu.edu (danieleaton)
19 Mar 2008 at 8:34am
Book: Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics, Oxford University Press, 2007, 269pp., Daniel Jacobson: "Berys Gaut's new book offers an extended argument for moralism about art: roughly, the thesis that the intrinsic moral flaws of an artwork count as aesthetic flaws, and its moral merits as aesthetic merits. The recent debate over moralism in the philosophy of art has generated some unfortunate terminological and taxonomic confusion. Gaut navigates this morass deftly, homing in on what is at issue between moralism and its two competitors: autonomism and an anti-theoretical view sometimes misleadingly termed immoralism. Autonomism holds that the moral qualities and defects of artworks are never aesthetically relevant. The anti-theoretical view holds that although the moral qualities of art are sometimes aesthetically relevant (contra autonomism), its morally dubious features can be among its aesthetic merits and its morally salutary features among its aesthetic flaws (contra moralism)." more
The Metaphysics Within Physics
by eat38447@obu.edu (danieleaton)
9 Feb 2008 at 1:26pm
Tim Maudlin, The Metaphysics Within Physics, Oxford University Press, 2007, 197pp., $49.95 (hbk), ISBN 9780199218219. Reviewed by Richard Healey, University of Arizona: "This brief but fertile volume develops and defends the basic idea that "metaphysics, in so far as it is concerned with the natural world, can do no better than to reflect on physics." It consists of six essays sandwiched between an introduction and an epilogue. Though written independently over more than fifteen years, in combination they offer a unified blueprint for the construction of a metaphysics based on physics. Maudlin proposes to build on a foundation in which laws of nature and a directed time are assumed as primitives which generate the cosmic pattern of events -- observable or not. Physical modality follows readily, but (he argues) physics does not itself employ a notion of causation. So causal and counterfactual locutions are fit candidates for an analysis that will supplement physical law with pragmatic factors, while metaphysical possibility is suspect beyond the bounds of physical possibility." more
New open-access journal: Philosophical Plays
by eat38447@obu.edu (danieleaton)
13 Jan 2008 at 2:19pm
PHILOSOPHICAL PLAYS is a new open-access journal/archive for modern philosophy plays & dialogues on happiness, satisfaction, love, life, death, afterlife, soul, religion, God, ethics, and the human condition. Elaborate footnotes/comments and full bibliographical references. ISSN 1654-6296 (print edition), ISSN 1654-6318 (online edition). ALL PLAYS/DIALOGUES are available at NO COST at the Philosophical Plays website, both in an electronic print edition (full PDF, FREE download, 6" x 9", classic typography for print), as well as in a FREE-ACCESS online edition (typography for on-screen reading, nice navigation, printer-friendly views, W3C-validated web pages, Mac/Windows & Explorer/Firefox/Opera/Safari compatible). THE FIRST ISSUE (Vol. 1, No. 1, January 2008) features the philosophical play "Katherine's Questionable Quest for Love and Happiness" by Bo C. Klintberg. CATEGORY: Philosophy play; historical fiction; comedy; social criticism.
Member of Anscombe Society Confesses Hoax
by jandrew_@hotmail.com (Didymus)
18 Dec 2007 at 4:37am
Nava '09 admits to fabricating assault, threat e-mails By Ilya Blanter and Kate Benner Princetonian Staff Writers Francisco Nava '09 has admitted to fabricating an alleged assault on him that he said occurred Friday evening and to sending threatening emails to himself, other members of the Anscombe Society and prominent conservative politics professor Robert George. He admitted the falsification today while being questioned by Princeton Township Police. http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/archives/2007/12/14/news/19743.shtml
CFP: Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association July ...
by eat38447@obu.edu (danieleaton)
17 Dec 2007 at 4:58pm
The Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association will be held at the University of Aberdeen in Scotland from 11-13 July 2008. The deadline for submitted papers for the Graduate Sessions and the Open Sessions is 1 February 2008. OPEN SESSIONS A number of parallel sessions on Saturday and Sunday afternoons will be available for the presentation of papers not previously published. There will be a considerable number of these sessions available, allowing room for many submissions to be included. The intention is to accommodate all philosophical material suitable for presentation to a professional audience, so far as time and space in the programme allow, and not to operate a selective policy. Each presentation should last no more than 20 minutes, so that a further 10-15 minutes may be allowed for discussion. Presented papers should aim to introduce material involving recent research. There are no restrictions on the areas of philosophy which papers may address. Philosophers whose papers are included in this part of the programme must be or become subscribing members of one of the organising societies.
 

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Education & Unions
25 Jan 2012 at 10:12pm
While there are many excellent schools, there are also serious problems plaguing American and other education systems. People are, of course, eager to point fingers and these fingers are often pointed at teachers? unions. Being a professor at a state ?
Disclosure. Deception. Duplicity. Defamation.
25 Jan 2012 at 6:07am
Here in Australia there is an interesting debate going on around the views of Melinda Tankard Reist (?MTR?), a high-profile anti-abortion and anti-pornography activist, and Jennifer Wilson, a relatively obscure (at least until now) blogger and occasional online op.ed writer. ?
Religion for Atheists: An Interview With Alain de Botton
24 Jan 2012 at 6:29pm
Alain de Botton, co-founder of London?s School of Life and author of The Consolations of Philosophy, has been kind enough to provide an interview for Talking Philosophy about his new book Religion for Atheists: A Non-Believer?s Guide to the Uses ?
Warbots
20 Jan 2012 at 5:05pm
The United States and many other nations currently operate military remote operated vehicles (ROVs) that are more commonly known as drones. While the ROVs began as surveillance devices, the United States found that they make excellent weapon platforms. The use ?
Freedom of Religion and the Secular State now published
17 Jan 2012 at 12:04am
If we use Amazon?s date for it, at least the date that is there this morning, today is the publication date for Freedom of Religion and the Secular State. In practice, the book will be available at slightly different times ?
Remote Controled Assassination
16 Jan 2012 at 8:38pm
Assassination was, obviously enough, not invented by Americans. While we were rather late to the game in this regard (being a young country, we deserve to be cut some slack) we have added our own American touch to the practice. ?
Educating for Profit
13 Jan 2012 at 8:16pm
� � In the face of the economic mess, American states and the federal government have been cutting education spending. In some cases, this is no doubt a matter of legitimate necessity. In other cases the economic woes have been ?
Guardians of the Future
11 Jan 2012 at 12:42pm
I went to the launch last night of a report by fellow tpm blogger, philosopher and green campaigner�Rupert Read, under the auspices of�the new think tank Green House.� The report is called ?Guardians of the Future:� a constitutional case for ?
Get That Chip Out of My Brain!
9 Jan 2012 at 2:26pm
There has of late been some discussion of free will and determinism, and particularly the relative merits of compatibilism versus incompatibilism, at various blogs. (See, for example, here, here and here.) I must confess that I?ve not followed these discussions ?
Pro-Life, Pro-Environment
7 Jan 2012 at 9:01am
Here in the States we are going through the seemingly endless warm up for our 2012 presidential election. President Obama is the candidate of the Democrats and the Republicans are trying to sort out who will be their person. �The ?